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Abstract 
The paper’s purpose is to shed more light on the impact of fiscal decentralization on the economy and determine 
whether or not a tipping point can be identified as an optimal point of fiscal decentralization. To do so, we proposed 
a new theoretical model to link two measurements of fiscal decentralization such as fiscal autonomy and fiscal 
importance to provincial GDP, and then apply our model with panel data to provincial GDP of Vietnam over ten 
years and across 56 provinces to test the significance of the impact of fiscal decentralization on the economy and 
compute the optimal point of fiscal decentralization. Generalized linear model with maximum likelihood method 
was applied to estimate coefficients in the analytical model. The results of empirical analysis indicated that our 
model is statistically significant and there exists an optimal point for fiscal decentralization with value captured is 
7.33 of fiscal autonomy index and 0.25 of fiscal importance index. Additionally, the study also investigated that the 
fiscal decentralization would become a positively influential element on the economy, if the degree of fiscal 
decentralization underlies the optimal point. If the degree of fiscal decentralization exceeds the optimal point, 
however, it would affect  negatively on the economy. 
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1. Introduction 
Up to now, there has been many debates about the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth and 
development. Many scholars have suggested that the fiscal decentralization could provide better public services 
and goods and instigate horizontal and vertical competition at a local and regional level (Tiebout, 1956; 
Musgrave, 1958; Oates, 1972). Contemporaneously, it was also known as one of the elements that creates 
incentives for subnational governments in fostering markets (Weingast, 1995; McKinnon, 1997) and allows for 
greater transparency and accountability (Azfar et al., 1999; Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002). The fiscal decentralization 
could also force governments to concentrate on the efficient production of public goods and services, limit the 
capacity of bureaucrats to act as revenue maximizers, generate greater consumer efficiency (Thießen, 2003), and 
improve resource allocation as well as potential for achieving Pareto efficiency (Martínez-Vázquez et al., 2003; 
Ezcurra et al., 2008). While a large number of scholars believed that the fiscal decentralization contributed 
considerably to economic growth, a few empirical analyses have shown that the fiscal decentralization hasn’t 
any significant correlation with, even it has affected negatively on economic growth in developing countries. 
Almost all of them assumed that the fiscal decentralization was a potential risk leading to budget deficits, 
influence of interest groups, lower quality of government decisions, corruption, greater interregional inequalities, 
causes leads to higher inflation rate, which may result in lower overall economic growth and development 
(Prud’Homme, 1995; Rodriguez and Gill, 2005; Rodden, 2003).  
For our initial perceive, the impact of fiscal decentralization on the economy can’t be expected in a monotonic 
way that is a positive or negative one as whole, it needs to be taken into account from the specific context of 
each country or region in a certain phase. According to Oates (1972), fiscal decentralization was a certain extent 
of fiscal power transferred from central to local governments to perform duties in providing public services and 
goods. This means that the fiscal decentralization related to two problems as the revenue-raising jurisdiction and 
the expenditure levels for public services and goods; in which the expenditure level of local government is 
dominated by the packages of public services and goods and the revenue depends on tax bases, local 
government’s own revenue source, borrowing power, and financial grants from central government. When the 
total cost of the packages of public services and goods exceeds the revenue, the financial shortage will occur. In 
order to compensate for this shortage, local governments need to increase their revenue by raising taxing level, 
borrowing, or more financial subsidy. In this case, the high degree of fiscal decentralization can become a 
catalyst promoting the economic growth and development. Whereas, if the total cost of them is lower than the 
revenue, it will lead to the financial superabundance, which can lead to negative issues such as misappropriation 
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and embezzlement (Rodriguez and Gill, 2005; Rodden, 2003) and consequently the high degree of fiscal 
decentralization can become an element impeding the economic growth and development.  
As discussed in the above paragraph, it is clear that there is a limitation of fiscal decentralization, where the 
excessive fiscal decentralization will become an element that affects negatively to the economy. This study’s 
purpose, therefore, is to determine a limit degree of fiscal decentralization that can be considered as an optimal 
point, where the output of an economy achievable is maximized, and to shed more light on the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on the economy, as a direction help authorities make decisions on fiscal decentralization and 
provide a new view of the impact of fiscal decentralization on the economy to academic literatures. To do so, we 
propose a new analytical model link fiscal decentralization to provincial GDP and then apply our model with 
panel data to provincial GDP of Vietnam over last ten years and across 56 provinces to test the significance of 
the impact of fiscal decentralization on the economy and compute the optimal point of fiscal decentralization. 
2. Fiscal decentralization in Vietnam 
First fiscal decentralization represented by Resolution No.108/CP on May 13th, 1980 has regulated that local 
governments’ revenues were constrained by their spending responsibilities based on earnings from fixed owned 
source revenue, fiscal transfer from central government to the provincial government, and shared taxes with a 
certain rate predetermined by the central government. However, at this time there was an imbalance between the 
assignment of expenditure responsibilities and taxing powers from the central government to local government 
(Vo, 2005). From 1983 to 1989, local governments’ revenues were determined by the economic capability of the 
locality and tax sharing rates were applied at a same level to all provinces (Resolution 138-HDBT, 1983). Local 
governments could receive a more amount if their revenue exceeded the assigned amount by the central 
government, however localities with financial difficulty could receive more revenue from increasing the shared 
tax rate by the central government. Within this regulation, provinces were not depended financially on the 
national government. During the period from 1989 to 1995, it was regarded as a breakthrough for Vietnam fiscal 
decentralization when Resolution 186/HDBT was issued on 27 November 1989. Provincial government’s 
spending was assigned based on their fiscal capacity. Tax rates shared by the central government were relatively 
different across provinces depending on the local government’s owned source revenue and spending assignment. 
When local government’s revenue is greater than their spending responsibilities, the surplus must be transferred 
to the national government, which contributed to the total consolidated government budget. 
In during period from 1980 to 1995, Vietnam has remarkable changes of fiscal decentralization, but it hasn’t any 
formal law on State budget issued. Fortunately, up to 1996, the first law on State budget was issued and 
implemented as an important milestone in Vietnam fiscal history. It has regulated about revenue and spending 
responsibilities for both the central government and the local government. The law was revised in 1998, but there 
were almost no changes of the principles of the issue. The revised problems related to its only mentioned in the 
extending the revenue-increasing jurisdiction and the spending responsibilities of provincial governments, but it 
did not mention spending responsibility and tax revenue to the local governments at the district and commune 
levels. So far, various issued policies represented the extent of fiscal power transfer from the central government 
to the provincial government in Vietnam. Typical for these policies were Decree No.93/2001/ND-CP and Decree 
No.141/2003/ND-CP, in which Decree No.93/2001/ND-CP allowed HCM City to implement the policy of 
management decentralization for taxing powers as the pioneering city in Vietnam. Decree No.141/2003/ND-CP 
related to the issuances of urban bonds from local governments at provincial levels are officially permitted, 
which represents provincial government’s borrowing powers.  
Thus, from after the national reunification, Vietnam’s fiscal decentralization was gradually becoming clearer. It 
was started by focusing on the assignment of expenditure responsibilities, the taxing power assignments to 
provincial governments, fiscal transfers from the national government, and finally subnational government’s 
borrowing power. 
3. Methodology  
3.1 Analytical model 
We begin with a heuristic device that describes the maximum output in an economy that can be produced from 
different combination of inputs using a given technology. This can be expressed mathematically as a mapping f: 
RN+→R+ such that Y=f(X), where X is a vector of factor inputs X=[X1, .., Xj, …, Xn] and f(X) is the maximum 
output that can be produced by a given set of inputs X ∈ R+. Support that Y is a Cobb-Douglas production 
function. According to Eric Miller (2008), the production function at time (t) could be given by 
   = 	
∏ Xj
βjn
j=1                                                                    (1) 
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, where Y(t) is the output of an economy in a time period of t, Xj is the jth input, λ is a growth parameter in period 
of t, and A is overall productive. As mentioned in the previous section, fiscal decentralization is a certain degree 
of fiscal power transferred from central government to local to perform duties in providing public services and 
goods. Here, the public services and goods provided by local government typically are public infrastructures, 
education, healthcare services, etc., which implies that the fiscal decentralization is a catalytic environment. It 
will be an element stimulating economic activities if the public service packages meet current needs of the 
locality. Whereas, it will become an impeding element if the packages are far different from current needs of that 
locality. Thus, the productive (A) is influenced by the fiscal decentralization (Z) that can be defined as a 
facilitating factor, and treated as endogenous factors. Support that A=exp(g(Z(t))), where Z(t) is the extent of 
fiscal decentralization at time (t), which implies that A>0 with any Z(t). Additionally, we assume that there exists 
a unique point of z*, z*∈ Z with Z ∈ R+, where A can capture a maximum value. This implies that if 0<Z<z*, Z 
will influence positively on output. Whereas, if z*<Z<+∞, Z will influence negatively on the output of the 
economy. In order to A obtains maximum value at z*, if and only if, g(Z(t)) is a quadratic equation with respect 
to Z and second condition of g(Z(t)) must be less than zero.  
To avoid the problem of sign restrictions and the complexity of computation, to restrict the value of g(Z(t)) within 
a sensible region, and to allow for both positive and negative marginal output of fiscal decentralization, we 
propose the following specification with respect to the role of fiscal decentralization in controlling productive 
(A) as 
A = exp(-g(Z(t))) = exp (-(a+bZ)2)                                                        (2) 
, where a and b are parameters. This function has a minimum of zero when ∂g(Z(t))/∂z=0, i.e., at the point where 
z*= –a/b, which implies that the sign of a ≠ b, due to z* >0 with any z*∈ Z. The value of function g(Z(t)) in the 
upper panel first decreases with Z; it reaches its minimum of zero at z* and then increases. Translated into the 
function of A=exp(-g(Z(t)) in the lower panel, the function of A first increases with Z and then the function 
decreases as illustrated in Figure 1. Y(t) is defined as 
 = 

	
∏ 


                                                          (3) 
 = 	


∏ 


                                                           (4) 
Eq.(4) implies that Z plays a role of controlling factor that government can control the output of economic 
activities through adjusting Z. We now consider a change of Y(t) in each period of time, T=[1,.., t, …, m] and T is 
assigned by a dummy variable of D. Taking the natural log on both sides and rearranging equation (4) as follows; 
 = 	∑  
!

"

 +	∑ $



 −	& + '(

)
                                        (5) 
Let -(a+bZ)2= -a - 2abZ - bZ2, -a2=α, -2ab=µ, -b2= η, equation (5) is rearranged as  
 = * +	∑  
!

"

 +	∑ $



 + µ( + ƞ()                                     (6) 
In order to estimate the parameters in Eq. (6), an error term ε is added to Eq.(6). We have an overall function, as 
equation (7), representing the relationship between output, inputs, and fiscal decentralization.  
 = * +	∑  
!



 +	∑ $



 + µ( + ƞ() + +                                 (7) 
This specification is appealing as it characterizes the output levels of fiscal decentralization control without 
imposing explicit bounds on the parameters in the nonlinear model. The illustrated process of fiscal 
decentralization conceptually differs from frequently used models of previous researchers (Davoodi, 1998; Eller, 
2004; Iimi, 2005). From Eq.(6), maximum value of output can capture, so logarithmic function is a covariate one, by 
the first derivative of LnY(T) with respect to Z, and setting to zero, 
,-.

,
= µ + 2ƞ( = 0                                                                      (8) 
(∗ =	−
µ
)ƞ
                                                                                   (9) 
From Eq. (9), it is easy to recognize that z*>0, if and only if, the sign of η differs the sign of µ, which implies 
there will exist an optimal point of the fiscal decentralization where the output of an economy will obtain a 
maximum value.  
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3.2 Measurement of fiscal decentralization 
So far, there have been many measurements of fiscal decentralization suggested by scientists. For instance, Oates 
(1972) employed the national government share in total public revenue as the degree of fiscal centralization. 
Woller and Phillips (1998) suggested that fiscal decentralization could be measured by one of four ways; (1) the 
ratio of local government revenues to total government revenues, (2) the ratio of local government revenues less 
grants-in-aid to total government revenues, (3) the ratio of local government expenditures to total government 
expenditures, and (4) the ratio of local government expenditures to total government expenditures less defense 
and social security expenditures. Additionally, Davoodi and Zou (1998) measured the degree of fiscal 
decentralization as the spending by SNGs as a fraction of total government spending. However, almost all their 
measures seem to be a lack of considering the relationship between the revenue-raising jurisdiction of and the 
assignment of spending responsibilities in providing services and goods to local governments, which 
inherently is particular important to access the degree of fiscal decentralization of an nation or region. Moreover, 
if the measurements of fiscal decentralization are built without considered from this relationship, it will become 
the measures that are far from the locality’s actual need of public services and goods, which is harder for 
authorities to make decisions on the degree of fiscal decentralization and it can lead to mistakes in process of 
fiscal decentralization. Fortunately, up to 2005, Duc Vo has constructed two measurements of fiscal 
decentralization that could reflect fully the relationship between the revenue-raising jurisdiction of and the 
assignment of spending responsibilities in providing services and goods to local governments, in other 
word the relationship between the expenditure and revenue of local governments, namely; fiscal autonomy 
and fiscal importance.  
For our purpose, two measurements of fiscal decentralization such as fiscal autonomy index and fiscal 
importance index provided by Duc Vo (2005) are employed as main measures, appropriate with the Vietnam 
context, for this study. In which the fiscal autonomy was measured by the ratio of total revenue to the total 
expenditures of local government as  
3 =
∑ 45
6
578
∑ 95
:
578
;ớ= ≠ ?                                                           (10) 
, where FAj is the fiscal autonomy of local government j, Rji is the ith revenue of the local government j, Eji is the 
ith expenditure of the local government j, and the fiscal importance of local government is measured by the ratio 
between total expenditure of local government and total public expenditures of the whole country as 
3@ =
∑ 95
6
578
9
;ớ= ≠ ?                                                            (11) 
, where FIj is the fiscal importance of local government j, TE is total public expenditures of all whole country. 
3.3 Data 
0 z* 
ABC 
A = EF−G( = EF	−& + 'H) 
G( = & + 'H) 
Figure 1 The relationship between A and Z 
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Panel data were employed in this study, collected from 56 provinces in Vietnam in the period from 2001 to 2011. 
It was supported by General Statistic Office, Ministry of Plan and Investment, and Ministry of Finance of 
Vietnam, including data of provincial GDP, provincial labor, provincial agricultural land area, provincial foreign 
direct investment capital, total revenue and public expenditure at provincial level, and total public expenditure at 
national level. In which total revenue at provincial level (R), total public expenditure at provincial level (E), and 
total public expenditure at national level (TE) were used to compute fiscal autonomy index (FA) and fiscal 
importance index (FI), based on equation (10) and (11). SPSS version 16.0 was used to analyze the variables. 
The summary statistic of variables was represented in Table 3.1, which shows that the range of provincial GDP 
variable fluctuates from 386.50 billion VND to 288000 billion VND, with mean value is 11852 billion VND. 
Similar to the GDP, the difference of population between provinces was also found to be considerable; of which 
the province with highest population is 7521.10 thousand people and the province by lowest population is only at 
the level of 278.4 thousand people. Not only with the variable of population, the disparity of foreign direct 
investment capital (FDI) variable and agricultural land area (ALA) variable were also found to be relatively large 
with a mean value of FDI variable is 747.92 million dollar and a mean value of ALA variable is 166.82 thousand 
ha. The result of summary statistics also reveals that there are a considerable disparity of fiscal autonomy and of 
fiscal importance between provinces with a mean value of fiscal importance is 0.0467 and of fiscal autonomy is 
1.042. 
Table 3.1 The results of summary statistics 
Variables Unit Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Provincial GDP (Y) Billion VND 11852 5860.7 386.5 288000 
Provincial POP (X1) Thousand peoples 1347.3 1120.8 278.4 7521.1 
Provincial FDI (X2) Million dollar 747.92 45.50 0.00 1900 
Provincial ALA (X3) Thousand ha 166.82 114.70 7.80 1238.32 
Fiscal autonomy (Z1) - 1.0427 1.0280 0.05 8.87 
Fiscal importance (Z2) - 0.0467 0.0340 0.001 0.42 
Note: GDP; Gross domestic production, POP; population, FDI; foreign direct investment capital, ALA; agricultural land area 
4. Result and discussion 
To clarify the impact of fiscal decentralization on the economy, measurements of fiscal decentralization such as 
the fiscal autonomy index (Z1) and fiscal importance index (Z2) were put into analytical models in the role of 
explanatory variables. Generalize Linear Model with Maximum Likelihood Estimate method was applied to 
estimate coefficients in models. Dummy variables employed is to show the trend of provincial GDP over time. 
Additionally, in order to enhance the strengthen of estimation results, three control variables, namely;  Provincial 
POP, Provincial FDI, and Provincial ALA, were linked to the analytical models. The results of regression 
analysis are represented in Table 4.1, which showed that both models are statistically significance with LR Chi-
Square value captured is 922.648 (model 1) and 904.448 (model 2). The sign of all coefficients of dummy 
variable was found to be positive and almost is statistically significance, which implies that the overall trend of 
provincial GDP increases significantly over years. Almost control variables have a positive and significant 
influence on provincial GDP, excepting variable of agricultural land area in model 1. 
As it is empirical evidence indicated in Table 4.1, the impact of fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance on 
provincial GDP are consistency in terms of the sign of the coefficients in both models. While variable of Z1 and 
Z2 have a positive and strong influence on provincial GDP, the impact of variables of Z12 and Z22 were found to 
be negative with correlated coefficients of -0.003 (model 1) and -1.711 (model 2), all are statistically 
significance at 1% level. This result is relatively suitable with our initial assumption that suggested that if the 
sign of the coefficients of Z1 and Z12 variable or/and of Z2 and Z22 variable were different, then there would exist 
an optimal point of fiscal decentralization (z*), where the output of an economy achievable is maximum. By 
replacing the estimated coefficients of Z1 and Z12  variable and of Z2 and Z22 variable into Eq.(9), the optimal 
point of fiscal decentralization was found to be 7.33 of fiscal autonomy index and 0.25 of fiscal importance 
index. The existence of this optimal point implies that there will be two scenarios about the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on the economy;  
For first scenario; if the degree of fiscal decentralization is in interval of [0, z*], the fiscal decentralization will 
become an element stimulating for economic growth and development. This is caused by the fact that when the 
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localities’ actual needs of public services and goods like infrastructure, education, and healthcare services, etc., 
increases due to the process of social-economic development, it will lead to an increase in the expenditure level 
of local government. When the expenditure level goes up beyond the revenue of local government, it will 
generate a financial shortage in the process of implementing the packages of public services and goods. In order 
to offset this shortfall, the local governments must increase their revenue by raising the tax level, borrowings, or 
calling for more financial subsidy from central government, or all three. However, if the taxing bases and 
borrowing power are imposed at a specific level by central government, in other word the revenue- increasing 
jurisdiction is restricted, the revenue-increasing of local governments will totally depend on grant resource of 
central government. In fact, the grants transferred from central government sometimes are delayed, due to the 
procedures of accountability and budget limitations, while the financial demand requires must be solved quickly 
to deploy public projects. So that, if the local governments only expect the grants from central government, the 
public projects provided by them will likely have to face with distortions that arise in implementing its and it will 
become more difficult to accomplish their projects timely. Whereas, if the local governments get more autonomy 
in taxation and borrowing power, the gap between the revenue and expenditure will soon be filled up and it will 
become easier for the local governments to implement their projects. Moreover, if the revenue- increasing 
jurisdiction of local governments is expanded, flexibility and creativity of local governments will be promoted 
maximally and the packages of public services and goods provided by them will be more suitable with the actual 
needs of that locality, which is very important to achieve high efficiency of the public projects (Shah, 2006). In 
this case, higher degree of fiscal decentralization can become an element that stimulates economic growth and 
development. 
For second scenario; it is suggested that the fiscal decentralization will become an element that has a negative 
influence on the economy, if the degree of fiscal decentralization is in interval of [z*, +∞]. The fact that when 
the locality’s actual need for public services and goods is at low level, the total expenditure level of local 
government to implement the public services and goods will also be low. And if this expenditure level is lower 
than the revenue that was collected from tax, borrowing, and grants from central government, the financial 
surplus will appear. Additionally, it is obvious that if the degree of fiscal decentralization increases, it will lead 
to the growth of the revenue-increasing jurisdiction of local government, which causes the growth of financial 
surplus. When the financial surplus increases, it can pullulate negative issues such as misappropriation and 
embezzlement that were determined as root of inflation, budget deficit, low quality of government decisions, 
corruption, and greater interregional inequalities (Prud’Homme, 1995; Rodriguez and Gill, 2004; Rodden, 2002). 
For example, to misappropriate redundancy amounts after accomplishing public projects that are suitable with 
the realize need of locality, local corrupt officials can design more public projects that inherently are far different 
from the actual demand of that locality, only with a sole purpose is for accountability. This doesn’t only lead to 
budget deficits from corrupt behaviors of local officials, but also it creates a big waste from investments to 
deploy these projects, which affects negatively to the economy. Thus, in this case, higher degree of fiscal 
decentralization will become an element that has a negative influence on the economy. 
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Table 4.1 Parameter Estimates 
Variables 
Model 1 
Fiscal autonomy index 
Model 2 
Fiscal importance index 
(Intercept) 1.035(0.0346)*** 1.124(0.0389)*** 
Dummy (2001) 0.161(0.0116)*** 0.158(0.0115)*** 
Dummy (2002) 0.130(0.0120)*** 0.123(0.0120)*** 
Dummy (2003) 0.114(0.0116)*** 0.111(0.0115)*** 
Dummy (2004) 0.095(0.0116)*** 0.092(0.0115)*** 
Dummy (2005) 0.077(0.0116)*** 0.073(0.0115)*** 
Dummy (2006) 0.063(0.0116)*** 0.057(0.0115)*** 
Dummy (2007) 0.048(0.0116)*** 0.043(0.0115)*** 
Dummy (2008) 0.030(0.0116)*** 0.023(0.0116)** 
Dummy (2009) 0.022(0.0115)* 0.023(0.0114)** 
Dummy (2010) 0.012(0.0113) 0.014(0.0114) 
Dummy (2011) 0.023(0.0113)** 0.017(0.0114) 
Ln(X1) 0.141(0.0045)*** 0.127(0.0057)*** 
Ln(X2) 0.002(0.0004)*** 0.002(0.0005)*** 
Ln(X3) 0.005(0.0032) 0.009(0.0034)** 
 Z1 0.044(0.0088)*** - 
 Z12 -0.003(0.0012)*** - 
 Z2 - 0.856(0.1742)*** 
 Z22 - -1.711(0.4399)*** 
(Scale) 0.004(0.0002) 0.004(0.0002) 
P-value 0.000 0.000 
LR Chi-Square 922.648 904.448 
Note: *Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level 
5. Conclusion 
With regards to the relationship of fiscal decentralization with economic growth and development, there are 
many harshly ongoing controversies within this topic. While a larger number of scholars believed that the fiscal 
decentralization contributes considerably to economic growth and development (Tiebout, 1956; Musgrave, 1958; 
Oates, 1972; Weingast, 1995; McKinnon, 1997; Azfar et al., 1999; Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002), a few others 
suggested that the fiscal decentralization hasn’t any significant correlation with, even it has a negative influence 
on economic growth in developing nations (Prud’Homme, 1995; Rodriguez and Gill, 2005; Rodden, 2003). Due 
to such debates, it became ambiguous in our perception of this relationship, which inherently is more difficult for 
authorities in making decisions on fiscal decentralization. For our initial awareness, fiscal decentralization can’t 
be expected in a monotonic way to be a positive or negative influence on the economy, it seems to exist a tipping 
point where the excessive fiscal decentralization will have a negative impact on the economy. In order to light up 
this idea, therefore, a new theoretical model was introduced in this study to shed more light on the impact of 
fiscal decentralization on the economy and identify the tipping point that is considered as an optimal point of 
fiscal decentralization.  
By applying our model to Vietnam economy, we have demonstrated that there exists an optimal point of fiscal 
decentralization, which implies that there will be two scenarios of the impact of fiscal decentralization on the 
economy. As it is a strong explanation, which was tested from our result of empirical analysis, for harshly 
ongoing controversies in during the last several decades; the fiscal decentralization will become an element 
stimulating economic growth and development, if the expenditure level to enforce duties in providing public 
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services and goods is less than or equal to the revenue of local government. Whereas, it will become a factor 
impeding economic growth and development, if the expenditure level is greater than the revenue of that local 
government. Additionally, we also note to authorities that in the process of making decisions on fiscal 
decentralization, it is necessary to take into account from locality’s actual need for public services and goods to 
avoid arising negative issues in future. In addition, in this study, we only employ two measurements of fiscal 
decentralization for our research purpose, so that using others is necessary to be conducted for next studies.     
Reference 
Azfar, O., Kähkönen, S., Lanyi, A., Meagher, P., & Rutherford, D., (1999), “Decentralization, Governance and 
Public Services: The Impact of Institutional Arrangements. A Review of the Literature”. College Park: IRIS 
Center, University of Maryland.  
Davoodi, H. & Zou, H.F. (1998), “Fiscal decentralization and economic growth: A cross-country study”. Journal 
of Urban Economics, 43: 244-257. 
Ebel, R., Yilmaz, S., (2002), “Concept of Fiscal Decentralization and Worldwide Overview”, Washington, D.C.: 
The World Bank Institute. 
Eric. M. (2008), “An Assessment of CES and Cobb-Douglas Production Functions”, Working Paper 2008-05, 
Congressional Budget Office,  http://www.cbo.gov/publication/19992. 
Eller, M. (2004), “The determinants of fiscal decentralization and its determinants on economic growth: 
empirical evidence from a panel of OECD countries”. Masters Thesis, Economics, Vienna University of 
Economics and Business Administration. 
Ezcurra, R. & Pascual, P. (2008), “Fiscal decentralisation and regional disparities: Evidence from several 
European Union countries”, Environment and Planning A 40:1185-1201. 
Iimi, A. (2004), “Decentralization and Growth Revisited: An Empirical Note”, Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 57. 
Martinez-Vazquez, J., and McNab, R. (2003), “Fiscal decentralization and economic growth”. World 
Development, 31: 1597–1616. 
McKinnon, R (1997), “Market-preserving fiscal federalism in the American Monetary Union”. In Blejer, M. and 
Ter-Minassian, T., eds., Macroeconomic Dimensions of Public Finance: Essays in Honour of Vito Tanzi, 
73-93. London: Routledge. 
Musgrave, R.A. (1958), “Multi-Level Finance.” Ed. R. A. Musgrave. New York: McGraw-Hill. National 
Constitutions website http://confinder.richmond.edu/ 
Oates, W. (1972), “Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich”. Polity IV Dataset 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity/ 
Prud’homme, R. (1995), “The dangers of decentralization”. World Bank Research Observer 10 201-220. 
Rodden, J. (2003), “Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal federalism and the growth of government”. International 
Organization, 57: 695–729. 
Rodríguez, P. A., & Gill, N. (2005), “On the economic dividend’ of devolution”. Regional Studies, 39(4): 405–420. 
Shah, A. (2006), “Fiscal decentralisation and macroeconomic management.” International Tax and Public 
Finance 13(4):437. 
Tiebout, C. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure”. Journal of Political Economy, 64(5). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/257839 
Thießen, U. (2003), “Fiscal decentralisation and economic growth in high income OECD countries”. Fiscal 
Studies, 24(3): 273–274. 
Weingast, B. (1995), “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market Preserving Federalism and Economic 
Development”,  Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 11(1): 1-31. 
Woller, G. & K. Phillips. (1998), “Fiscal decentralisation and LDC economic growth: An empirical 
investigation.” Journal of Development Studies 34(4):139-148. 
 
The IISTE is a pioneer in the Open-Access hosting service and academic event 
management.  The aim of the firm is Accelerating Global Knowledge Sharing. 
 
More information about the firm can be found on the homepage:  
http://www.iiste.org 
 
CALL FOR JOURNAL PAPERS 
There are more than 30 peer-reviewed academic journals hosted under the hosting 
platform.   
Prospective authors of journals can find the submission instruction on the 
following page: http://www.iiste.org/journals/  All the journals articles are available 
online to the readers all over the world without financial, legal, or technical barriers 
other than those inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself.  Paper version 
of the journals is also available upon request of readers and authors.  
 
MORE RESOURCES 
Book publication information: http://www.iiste.org/book/ 
 
IISTE Knowledge Sharing Partners 
EBSCO, Index Copernicus, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, JournalTOCS, PKP Open 
Archives Harvester, Bielefeld Academic Search Engine, Elektronische 
Zeitschriftenbibliothek EZB, Open J-Gate, OCLC WorldCat, Universe Digtial 
Library , NewJour, Google Scholar 
 
 
